Skip to main content

Table 4 Results from GMNL model and marginal willingness to pay

From: Preferences of physicians for public and private sector work

  Mean (se) SD Marginal WTPd (% annual income) Marginal WTP (AUD$ annual income)
Change in earnings 0.096***
(0.004)
-   
Change in hours worked − 0.106***
(0.005)
0.057***
(0.006)
− 1.10 − $3591
On calla: 1 in 4, frequently called out − 0.196***
(0.049)
0.661***
(0.062)
22.24 $72 461
On calla: 1 in 4, infrequently called out 1.118***
(0.069)
0.747***
(0.071)
35.87 $116 885
On calla: 1 in 10, frequently called out 1.416***
(0.062)
0.797***
(0.099)
38.97 $126 976
Percentage of time in private practice − 0.006***
(0.001)
0.021***
(0.001)
− 0.06 − $187
Teaching/research opportunitiesb: some 0.429***
(0.046)
0.811***
(0.060)
8.90 $28 988
Time spent in administration − 0.065***
(0.007)
0.098***
(0.008)
− 0.67 − $2191
Locationc: Metro-based 0.413***
(0.040)
0.425***
(0.037)
12.83 $41 808
Locationc: Metro-based + option to visit 0.409***
(0.048)
1.042***
(0.070)
12.79 $41 662
Constant (job A) − 4.262***
(0.097)
2.155***
(0.099)
  
Constant (job B) − 4.190***
(0.089)
1.886***
(0.110)
  
Tau 1.038***
(0.050)
   
Gamma − 0.585***
(0.107)
   
Log-Likelihood − 12 833
Number of observations 90 891
Chi-sq. (df) 3030 (12)***
AIC 25 716
BIC 25 951
  1. *p < 0.1
  2. **p < 0.05
  3. ***p < 0.01
  4. aReference category is ‘1 in 2 frequently called out’
  5. bReference category is ‘none’
  6. cReference category is ‘large regional centre’
  7. dFor categorical attributes marginal willingness to pay is not simply the ratio of coefficients because they are effects coded (see Scott et al. [28] for method)