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Table 4 Results from GMNL model and marginal willingness to pay

From: Preferences of physicians for public and private sector work

 

Mean (se)

SD

Marginal WTPd (% annual income)

Marginal WTP (AUD$ annual income)

Change in earnings

0.096***

(0.004)

-

  

Change in hours worked

− 0.106***

(0.005)

0.057***

(0.006)

− 1.10

− $3591

On calla: 1 in 4, frequently called out

− 0.196***

(0.049)

0.661***

(0.062)

22.24

$72 461

On calla: 1 in 4, infrequently called out

1.118***

(0.069)

0.747***

(0.071)

35.87

$116 885

On calla: 1 in 10, frequently called out

1.416***

(0.062)

0.797***

(0.099)

38.97

$126 976

Percentage of time in private practice

− 0.006***

(0.001)

0.021***

(0.001)

− 0.06

− $187

Teaching/research opportunitiesb: some

0.429***

(0.046)

0.811***

(0.060)

8.90

$28 988

Time spent in administration

− 0.065***

(0.007)

0.098***

(0.008)

− 0.67

− $2191

Locationc: Metro-based

0.413***

(0.040)

0.425***

(0.037)

12.83

$41 808

Locationc: Metro-based + option to visit

0.409***

(0.048)

1.042***

(0.070)

12.79

$41 662

Constant (job A)

− 4.262***

(0.097)

2.155***

(0.099)

  

Constant (job B)

− 4.190***

(0.089)

1.886***

(0.110)

  

Tau

1.038***

(0.050)

   

Gamma

− 0.585***

(0.107)

   

Log-Likelihood

− 12 833

Number of observations

90 891

Chi-sq. (df)

3030 (12)***

AIC

25 716

BIC

25 951

  1. *p < 0.1
  2. **p < 0.05
  3. ***p < 0.01
  4. aReference category is ‘1 in 2 frequently called out’
  5. bReference category is ‘none’
  6. cReference category is ‘large regional centre’
  7. dFor categorical attributes marginal willingness to pay is not simply the ratio of coefficients because they are effects coded (see Scott et al. [28] for method)